What if Trump fires Mueller or starts mass pardons? It would backfire.

Note: Slate published this post as “Trump Can’t Escape the States.”

 There are more and more signals that Trump is exploring firing Mueller and pardoning anyone and everyone in his circle. So what would happen next? The bottom line is that those moves would backfire spectacularly.

First, can Trump pardon himself? That’s surprisingly hard to answer. The constitutional text gives no answer, and the Convention debates aren’t particularly helpful. Some people cite the Latin phrase “Nemo judex in causa sua” (One can’t be a judge in his own case) as some kind of answer, but the pardon power is executive, not judicial, so a president isn’t formally a judge in his own case. Plus we don’t live in Rome, even if the Latin sounds wicked smart. The bottom line is that the only significant barriers to self-pardons are politics (impeachment) and federalism (state powers).

 Presidential pardons can’t apply to state prosections. So state attorneys general, especially NY’s Eric Schneiderman, DC’s Karl Racine, and Delaware’s Matthew Denn should think about cancelling their summer vacation plans.  (Yes, Delaware. Go Google “quo warranto.” Or see my old post or see below.) And maybe they should open up some office space for Bob Mueller and his A-team when he inevitably gets fired for getting closer and closer to hard evidence of serious crimes.

Anyway, three big points: 1) This is your increasingly regular public service announcement that the president cannot pardon people for state crimes. Even if Trump pardons Kushner, a state prosecutor can bring charges under state law any time. Similarly, Trump can be prosecuted under state law. Nixon’s attorney general concluded in 1974 that a sitting president can’t be indicted, but there is no constitutional text or precedent for such a conclusion, and it was obviously an interpretation that benefited Nixon. I think this is an open question, and on balance, I think the better argument is that the president can be indicted.

2) Pardons will backfire. If you’re pardoned, you can’t plead the 5th Amendment, the privilege against self-incrimination, because you can no longer face a penalty for incrimination. So if Kushner, for example, gets pardoned, he can still get a subpoena to testify. If he tries to plead the 5th, he would be help in contempt of court and face jail. If he testifies and lies, the pardon for old crimes does not extend to new crimes post-pardon. He would face jail for perjury. So ultimately, Trump pardoning Kushner, Flynn, etc. would actually make it more likely that they would have to testify.

[Update on pardons: Upon reflection, I overlooked that one of my points, that state prosecutors can charge state crimes even after presidential pardons, conflicts with another point: that pardoned people can’t plead the 5th. If a federally pardoned person might face state charges, they can still invoke the 5th Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination. But even if they can take the 5th, the danger of state conviction under a mountain of documented evidence would still be enough to get someone like Flynn or Manafort to flip and be a witness against Trump.]

3) Pardons can be their own basis for impeachment. Impeachment is for high crimes and misdemeanors, which are not the same thing as regular crimes in the books. If a president abuses his or her power, that abuse can be the basis of impeachment even if that abuse isn’t formally covered by any criminal statute. For example, if Trump simply disregarded Supreme Court rulings on immigration (or if he disregarded the law to sabotage health care), Congress could impeach and convict. Abuse of the pardon power could be the same. I’d go further and argue that the use of the pardon to obstruct a criminal investigation is, well, obstruction of justice.

A president has the power to order a military strike, but not if his intent is to murder someone who has dirt on him or who is sleeping with his wife. Similarly, Trump has the power to fire FBI directors, but his intent can be criminal and violate the obstruction statutes (18 USC 1503, 1505 and 1512(c)(2)), as I’ve written before. So too does a president have the power to pardon, but not for bribes, for example. And in this case, Trump has the power to pardon, but not to obstruct justice (under the same statutes).

4) OK, on to the Mueller question. Can Trump fire Mueller? I’ve been reading a lot about this, and I’ll rely on Jack Goldsmith, who was part of the Comey/Mueller high speed thriller in 2003: It turns out that there is no clear answer.

So let’s assume that Trump will fire Mueller. It turns out that there are many ways for him to get back on the case:

A) A state prosecutor, with the help from a state attorney general or governor, could hire Mueller and his A-Team of lawyers. They’d have subpoena power under state criminal law.

B) State attorneys general could use their quo warranto power to investigate the Trump Organization, fraud, and money laundering from Russian sources.

C) A Congressional committee could hire him, such as the Senate Intelligence Committee. Or Congress could create a Joint Select Committee.

D) Congress could pass a new Independent Counsel statute that circumvents the president. Congress would need a veto-proof 2/3 supermajority of each House. Don’t hold your breath on that one.

E) The civil litigation on emoluments (there are now three suits) and the very intriguing new suit (Cockrum) against the Trump campaign for hacking conspiracy can also pursue many of the same questions, and Mueller and his lawyers could be called in as a witness in these cases.

The bottom line is that there are many paths to continue this investigation. If Trump pardons people or fires Mueller, those moves will backfire almost as badly as firing Comey.

A New Civil Case Powerfully Opens a New Front Against Trump for Russia Conspiracy

A new civil complaint has been filed against the Trump campaign, and it is perhaps the most compelling private case filed so far, because it focuses powerfully on the Russian hacking conspiracy with three plaintiffs who were concretely harmed by the release of private information. In Cockrum et al. v. Donald Trump for President, the plaintiffs have solid standing and a firm foundation in a statutory claim: long-standing civil rights law protecting voting rights and privacy from intimidation and harm. One question that needs to be resolved is about whether it fits the requirement for “state action” by the defendant, but the history of the statute should help answer this question. And because the conspiracy involved interstate (and international) electronic conduct, the Interstate Commerce Clause should be sufficient to extend this statute to these (quasi-)private actors.

Each plaintiff has a compelling story of harm, because the hacking conspiracy released deeply private information or sensitive financial and contact information. The complaint sets out step-by-step the facts suggesting the coordination between Russian hackers and the Trump campaign, and it is actually a riveting weaving of many strands and events over the past year.

The legal theory comes from statutes passed after the Civil War to protect civil rights during Reconstruction (it was originally called the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, or the Enforcement Act, and these set of statutes were intended to address non-state actors organized to intimidate). The statutory basis is 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3):

(3)Depriving persons of rights or privileges

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire … for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.


This statute directly addresses conspiracies to intimidate voters or injure voters because of their support for a candidate. The hackers knew that they were releasing private financial and other private information, and that knowledge is enough to constitute a conspiracy of intimidation, even if it was not their primary goal. The very goal of hacking was to release private information, without regard to whose privacy would be infringed. And it is certainly plausible from the facts that one of the goals of the hacking was to intimidate the Clinton campaign and its supporters — including these plaintiffs — from participating in the election. There are certainly many others who could have brought this suit, but these three plaintiffs have a strong case. And the plaintiffs do not need to be targeted because of race. They have a valid case if their freedom of association and political support is targeted. For background on how Section 1985 has been applied broadly, see this piece.

There is some question, under the precedents, about whether the defendants need to be state actors or officials. Keep in mind that these statutes were originally passed to protect against the KKK, non-state actors who organized to intimidate. The concept here is acting “under the color of state law,” so that a private actor is covered by the statute’s requirements. The question may be if a campaign is a quasi-state actor. Courts have also allowed the Commerce Clause to be the basis for extending this law to private parties, but these cases have been curtailed. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) and Scott, 103 S.Ct. at 3357. As I noted before, the interstate/international hacking, like wire fraud, is covered by interstate commerce, and thus the statute through the Interstate Commerce Clause should apply to this particular conduct. More work needs to be done in this area.

This case may seem redundant with Mueller’s investigation and the Senate and House investigation, but what if Trump fires Mueller? What if the House and Senate Republicans stall? A civil case offers the advantage of decentralized access of discovery, and potentially a more public investigation while the other institutions move secretly and slowly.

More problems with the campaign finance charge against Don Jr.

The statute we’ve been discussing as the basis for prosecuting Don Jr (based only on what we already know) is 52 USC 30121, soliciting a contribution or “thing of value” from a foreign national. In addition to the problem of applying “a thing of value” to general information and meetings (a 1st Amendment problem and a line-drawing problem, as I’ve written before), it’s also a problem that the conduct might not even be criminal under the statute.

I’ve been trying to find any mention that there is a criminal penalty for 52 US 30121 as applied to Don Jr’s attempt.  This section does not mention criminal liability (jail or criminal fine), nor does the other section in the statute that covers enforcement across the sections, 52 USC 30109 (it doesn’t mention 30121 at all). The only possible criminal penalty would be in 30109(d)(1)(a), but only if the value of the contribution or “thing” exceeds a threshold of $2,000 or $25,000. It’s hard to put any value on the completely ambiguous prospect of some information, and of course, at this stage, the parties claim the value was zero (I’m skeptical, but we are only working with what we know now).  Some have cited government webpages or cases with criminal prosecutions under 30121, but those cases apply only when there was a contribution over those dollar value thresholds, unlike this case.

The bottom line is that it’s not clear that the statute offers any criminal liability for Don Jr, even if the text of the statute (“thing of value”) could apply to the Russia lawyer’s offer of information.


Re-thinking the “Thing of Value” Campaign Finance Charge Against Don Jr.

[I was interviewed on PBS on this topic. Link here.]

I’ve been thinking a lot about my claim in a post on Monday night that Donald Trump, Jr., committed a crime by soliciting a “thing of value” (opposition research) from a foreign national, under 51 U.S.C. 30121. All day Tuesday, I’ve seen more and more commentators, lawyers, and commentators make the same argument. On Tuesday morning, I posted a note of caution about this interpretation for political speech and 1st Amendment concerns. After thinking about it more and reading more, I don’t think such a broad interpretation is correct, and I retract my earlier claims.

First, how do we draw a line between “opposition research” and information or investigation? It’s impossible. So essentially, this interpretation would criminalize a campaign official talking to foreign nationals about anything related to the opponent or even their own candidate.

For example, in 2012, let’s say a newspaper or website published a document purporting to be a Kenyan birth certificate for Barack Obama. Let’s say an Obama campaign official traveled to Kenya to obtain that birth certificate. Would the certificate itself be a “thing of value”? What if that official talked to Kenyan officials about how to prove or disprove the authenticity of that birth certificate? Any conversation would be a “thing of value.” Now let’s say a Romney campaign official did any of these acts (or back in 2008, a Clinton campaign staffer had done the same). It would be “opposition research,” but it would have to be protected speech and not a criminal violation.  [Update: One reader somehow thought I was implying that it would be illegal for Obama staffer but legal for Romney staffer. Just to clarify: I think it would obviously be legal for the Obama staffer to talk to the Kenyan national, even though the information is obviously “a thing of value.” So if it’s legal for an Obama staffer, it has to be legal for a Romney staffer.]

Similarly, let’s say in the summer of 2016, a Russian official contacted the Clinton campaign with information that the Russian government was behind the hacking. Such information would be a “thing of value” to the campaign. Maybe the most appropriate reaction should be to direct the Russian informant to the FBI, but surely it would not be criminal for a Clinton official to meet with the informant to make sure to get the information as soon as possible.

Moreover, I cannot find any case that comes close to applying the campaign finance “thing of value” wording to information or opposition research from a foreign national. And there seems to be good reason for courts to avoid going so far.  [I’m adding a note here about the rule of lenity: In construing an ambiguous criminal statute, a court should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant.]

I have more to say on new evidence that the Don Jr. meeting was probably related to hacking Clinton emails, given the timeline, but for now, I am being more cautious and circumspect about my earlier claims that there is already evidence of a crime. At this moment, I don’t think the Don Jr. emails in and of themselves constitute evidence of a crime. Other context, such as awareness of Russian hacking before June 3, or the campaign focusing on the hacked Clinton/DNC emails immediately after, might relate to criminal violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 and other laws.

Update on Don Jr. emails and criminal case: What is a “thing of value”? What is “collusion”?

When I posted on the breaking news last night, I was working with the claim that receiving opposition research information from foreign sources could be a violation of campaign finance laws. The question is if this information is a “thing of value” and if it could be covered by the criminal statute 52 USC 30121. The problem is that, even if opposition research (“dirt”) is surely something of value, it is also speech. I can find no precedent interpreting information as a “thing of value” under 52 USC 30121, and there is probably good reason for this caution.

There is a lot of damning material in Don Jr.’s emails released today, but nothing makes the meeting more than sharing information.

Here are the new details: Family friend Rob Goldstone identified the lawyer as a “Russian government attorney” who had “documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to your father.”  The material is “ultra sensitive” because it was “part of Russia and its government’s support for Mr. Trump.” Trump Jr., responded, “If it’s what you say I love it especially later in the summer.” It appears that Trump Jr. forwarded this thread to Kushner and Manafort, so they seem to know this context.

On the one hand, it doesn’t matter if the lawyer wasn’t in fact a Russian government attorney and that she didn’t deliver any real information. The issue is intent.

On the other hand, there is no additional evidence that Trump Jr. had any reason to believe that this information was obtained illegally (by hacking or otherwise). My concern is that it may be too big a leap to criminalize the sharing of information from a foreign national or a foreign official.

There is no free-standing crime of “collusion.” A criminal case may turn on a link between the Trump campaign and the illegal hacking, in terms of awareness, coordination, and encouragement. The bigger questions may now be about Kushner and Manafort, their lack of disclosures, and perhaps any lies or obstruction of justice.


The Conspiracy Case Against Don Jr. (and Kushner and Manafort and…)

[NOTE: I’ve revised or retracted some of the arguments below in a follow-up post: https://shugerblog.com/2017/07/12/re-thinking-the-thing-of-value-campaign-finance-charge-against-don-jr]

Tonight, the New York Times story is a smoking gun of Donald Trump, Jr.’s criminal conspiracy to collude with a foreign national, but it also entangles Manafort and Kushner rather directly. The New York Times reports, “Before arranging a meeting with a Kremlin-connected Russian lawyer he believed would offer him compromising information about Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump Jr. was informed in an email that the material was part of a Russian government effort to aid his father’s candidacy, according to three people with knowledge of the email.” Yesterday’s Times story reports that Don Jr. pulled Manafort and Kushner into the same meeting, and it wasn’t because they care deeply about adoption policy.

I’m pulling together the work of Bob Bauer and Jennifer Taub here. The relevant statute is 52 USC 30121:

“It shall be unlawful for—

(1) a foreign national, directly or indirectly, to make—

(A) a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value, or to make an express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election…
(2) a person to solicit, accept, or receive a contribution or donation described in subparagraph (A) … from a foreign national.”
As Jennifer Taub pointed out to me, such violations can be prosecuted as crimes.
Keep in mind “a thing of value” includes information, as campaign finance expert (and NYU Law Professor of Practice) Bob Bauer has explained several times.
Also keep in mind that the Russian lawyer met as a representative of the Russian government, but it doesn’t matter: she is a foreign national regardless of her relationship with the Russian government. And it doesn’t matter if the Russian lawyer actually provided any information. The New York Times story, if true, shows Donald Jr. believed that the Russian government was involved in providing information, so he had intent to violate the statute. Thus, he engaged in a criminal conspiracy to violate these post-Watergate campaign finance laws, and between his own confessions to the basic facts on Sunday plus this reported email, Don Jr. doesn’t have anywhere to hide.
Josh Marshall at Talking Points Memo made an important observation today: that five White House insiders or Trump advisers are the sources. Marshall wrote, “The only reason a President’s allies ever do something like that is either to get ahead of something much more damaging or get a first crack at shaping the public understanding of something much more damaging. There’s really no other explanation. We don’t know yet what drove them to volunteer such highly damaging information. Five of them did it. It wasn’t a matter of one person going rogue.”
I’m also struck by suggestions that the White House insiders are conspiring now to pin the blame on Donald Jr. to save the rest of the administration. Kushner and Manafort are now wrapped up into this conspiracy, and they failed to disclose this meeting, among all the others. Have they been questioned by the FBI or Mueller’s team, and did they lie under oath? Now Trump will probably be questioned under oath about the meeting, too.  But perhaps the most important result of these bombshells is political optics. President Trump already has a slam dunk case of obstruction of justice, but the problem had been that it was unclear what he was obstructing. Now the public has a clear story of a crime that Trump was obstructing. And who knows what other shoes will drop next, and which of these co-conspirators will flip next. What does Flynn know? Mueller will be asking, and he has more and more to work with everyday.
[Update: Kushner and Manafort now appear to have violated 18 U.S.C. 4, Misprision of a Felony:
“Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.”
So now Kushner and Manafort are facing another grounds for indictment, and whoever else knew of this meeting will be facing charges, too.]
Update, 7/11, 8:45am: Randall Eliason has more on these criminal charges at Sidebar:

“The Rise of the Prosecutor Politicians”: Database of Prosecutorial Experience for Justices, Circuit Judges, Governors, AGs, and Senators, 1880-2017

[Update: The Prison Policy Initiative drew on this research for some excellent analysis and graphics about modern “law and order” politics and mass incarceration. Link here.]

I am working on a book project, tentatively titled, “The Rise of the Prosecutor Politician.” My working hypothesis has been that the emergence of the prosecutor’s office as a stepping stone for higher office was a relatively recent/20th century phenomenon with dramatic consequences in American criminal law and mass incarceration.  This year, I will be publishing the first chapter on Earl Warren and his role as prosecutor/Attorney General/candidate for Governor in the Japanese Internment in 1941-42.

I started working on this project after two observations. The first was a very productive engagement with my brilliant Fordham law colleague John Pfaff, who has empirically documented a better explanation for the explosion of mass incarceration over the past few decades: prosecutors have dramatically increased their rates of bringing charges and prosecuting per arrest. I suggested an historical explanation: prosecutors increasingly focus on their job as a stepping stone to higher office. The office draws more ambitious politicians, and those emerging politicians seek a reputation for being tough and crime, and they dread the possibility that they would have dropped the charges against a defendant who later commits a heinous crime, because that “mistake” could jeopardize their ascent or their re-election. (Only Delaware, New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode Island and D.C. have maintained appointments for prosecutors). They prosecute more arrests out of a combination of ambition and fear.

The second observation was of the failures to convict in a series of deaths of black men killed by police in Ferguson and Staten Island. I suggested that suburban/rural prosecutors generally underperform, and perhaps even sabotage, their prosecutions of police in these cases because of their own political ambitions. Here are three stories:

On August, 9, 2014, police officer Darren Wilson shot and killed Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. The facts of the shooting are still unclear, but it is clear that Prosecuting Attorney Bob McColloch handled the case unlike the way prosecutors handle most cases. He brought the case to a grand jury before the police investigation was complete, he did not endorse any charges, and he presented a significant amount of exculpatory evidence, and called a large number of witnesses whose testimony benefited the defendant, all of which are highly unusual.[1] McColloch even acknowledged that he knew that one of those pro-defendant witnesses was probably lying and had been discredited by investigators. A former judge has filed a bar complaint alleging professional misconduct by McColloch and his staff.[2]

On July 17, 2014, in Staten Island, Officer Daniel Pantaleo, arrested Eric Garner for selling loose cigarettes illegally. After Garner swatted away Pantaleo’s hand, Pantaleo put Garner in a choke hold for fifteen seconds, all captured on video. Garner repeated, “I can’t breathe.” Four or five officers stood by while Garner lost consciousness and did not perform CPR. Garner was dead on arrival at the hospital. Daniel Donovan, the Staten Island district attorney, brought the case to a grand jury, and the grand jury declined to indict on Dec. 3, just a few days after the Ferguson jury declined to indict. About one month later, Donovan declared his candidacy for Staten Island’s seat in the U.S. Congress. He contends that he handed the case to his staff, and he never met with witnesses or stepped into the grand jury chambers once.[3] He has fought efforts by the Garner family and civil rights groups to have the grand jury transcript released. Polling showed that voters approved of Donovan’s handling of the case by almost two to one.[4] Soon after the grand jury declined to indict, Donovan won the House seat by about a 60% to 40% margin.

Meanwhile, after Freddie Gray died in the back of a police van in Baltimore, State’s Attorney Marilyn Mosby indicted six police officers quickly after evidence suggested wrongdoing. Mosby’s constituency is very different from McColloch’s and Donovan’s. Chief Judge Sol Wachtler of the New York Court of Appeals famously said that a prosecutor could get a grand jury to “indict a ham sandwich,” if he wanted to. The real question is whether he or she wants to, and that question often turns on whether the public wants to.

[1] Dana Milbank, “Bob McColloch’s Pathetic Prosecution of Darren Wilson,” (Op-Ed), Nov. 25, 2014; Jeffrey Toobin, “How Not to Use a Grand Jury,” New Yorker, Nov. 25, 2014; Citron, Eric. “Cases and controversies: Not your typical grand jury investigation” http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/cases-and-controversies-not-your-typical-grand-jury-investigation/.

[2] Carol Daniel, “Bar Complaint Filed Against McColloch, “http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2015/01/05/bar-complaint-filed-against-mcculloch/

[3] Alexander Burns, “Daniel Donovan, Garner Case Prosecutor, Defense Record as He Runs for Congress.” (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/25/nyregion/staten-island-prosecutor-defends-his-record-as-he-seeks-house-seat.html?_r=0

[4] Theodoric Meyer, “Prosecutor in Eric Garner case nears election to Congress,”


There are many layers to the crisis in policing in America, but it is important to note that one factor is that many prosecutors are unwilling to police the police. One factor that makes prosecutors so finely attuned to public opinion: the office of prosecutor has become a stepping stone to higher office in America. Thus, the office tends to attract a more political animal, a more ambitious type. Anecdotally, law students with political aspirations tend to gravitate towards preosecutors’ offices. Then, the stakes in prosecutors’ decisions are often higher than simply whether one keeps a job as a prosecutor or moves into private practice. Life goals are in the balance.

Then I started to research the historical trends: When did elected officials start to have a significant background as prosecutors earlier in their career?  When did the office of prosecutor become a stepping stone for higher office.

I started with the parties’ nominees for president. The pattern was striking. For most of American history, presidential candidates were generally military heroes (so to speak!) or lawyers in private practice. There were more full-time academics than long-serving prosecutors who became president. The handful of presidential candidates who had experience as prosecutors were the exceptions that proved the rule: they seemed to stumble into the office of district attorney as young men looking for jobs, and then very quickly moved laterally to similarly low prestige jobs. Stephen Douglas, Lincoln’s interlocutor, served one two-year term as a state’s attorney, did not accomplish much, and then returned to private practice. Grover Cleveland and William McKinley both served one two-year term as district attorneys, and then flipped and made their names as criminal defense lawyers. Intriguingly, McKinley’s prominent defense of labor activists won the attention of the anti-labor Republican Mark Hanna, who persuaded McKinley to flip against labor. William Taft served one term as a prosecutor straight out of law school, and then switched to the widely-beloved, upwardly mobile office of … tax collector.

Then two names leap off the page from this study, both in the 1930s, one in New York, one in California: Thomas Dewey (of “Dewey Defeats Truman” fame) and Earl Warren (of “Earl Warren” fame). Both were mediocre students, but were enthusiastic about public interest and passionate about fighting corruption. Neither one sought out the office of prosecutor when they began their legal careers in private practice. But both stumbled into their prosecutorial careers at a pivotal re-organization moment in American history: the rise of organized crime and organized labor, mixing with already organized (and increasingly corrupt) political machines. The administrative state and the police were also growing into a more organized power, and along with them, prosecutors gained more power, prestige, and funding. The media were also more organized and national, and the newspapers and movie reels sensationalized crime. They turned urban mobsters into powerful national anti-heroes, and turned local prosecutors into national heroes

Then, with the help of research assistants, we turned to Supreme Court Justices, circuit judges, governors, state attorneys general, and senators from the 1880s to the present.  The Supreme Court Justices is relatively consistent with the pattern of presidents: Very few have any prosecutorial experience until the 1890s. Then some have a few years as prosecutor before they became Justices, but the most dramatic change is in the 1930s through the 1950s, when roughly half of the Justices had significant — even very high profile — prosecutorial background: Owen Roberts, the special counsel in the Teapot Dome corruption scandal; Hugo Black, Frank Murphy, and then five in a row in the 1940s-50s: Vinson, Clark, Minton, Warren, and Harlan II. Again, the shift seems to be in the 1930s through the 1940s.

But our state state-by-state study of circuit judges, governors, state attorneys general, and senators is less clear.  Many states show a rise in prosecutors winning higher office in the 1930s, but many states also show this rise much earlier. More states see an increase in 1900-1920, and perhaps it makes sense that the states would precede and foreshadow a national trend, but the gap is bigger than simply being a first step in the same chain. States have always been far more significant in criminal enforcement than the feds, but this was even more true in the late 19th century and early 20th century. The progressive era witnessed the growth of state government regulation and power over crime, morality, and racial supremacy. Perhaps these other trends help explain the earlier rise of prosecutors in state office.  Some circuit courts also show a trend earlier (4th, 6th, 5th, 7th, 8th), some in the 1930s-40s (9th and DC), and some have seen this trend only later (1st, 2d, 3d).

I am posting this tentative database here, even if it needs additional checking, for a few reasons: 1) I hope to share this research more broadly, because I know some researchers have similar questions recently; 2) I hope to crowdsource some help with checking this documentation and categorization; 3) and I hope to crowdsource some additional interpretation of these trends and patterns.

I want to clarify the color-coding: for the Justices, I put those with prosecutorial background in red, but bold signifies those with significant/prominent prosecutorial experience. In the other charts, red signifies prosecutorial experience, and blue signifies more prominent political figures. I will probably fix this color coding over time to conform to the Justices page. I also want to thank the research assistants on this project: Matthew Grier, Julie Hendrickson, Eleazar Jacobs, and Jessica Lee.  If you have suggestions or comments, contact me at:


Here is the link to the database: